We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then recover over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger and the recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.
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Fed Reserve Bank Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA USAEcole Polytech Fed Lausanne, Swiss Finance Inst, Lausanne, Switzerland
Lester, Benjamin
Weill, Pierre-Olivier
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CEPR, Washington, DC 20009 USA
UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAEcole Polytech Fed Lausanne, Swiss Finance Inst, Lausanne, Switzerland
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NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
Lagos, Ricardo
Rocheteau, Guillaume
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Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
Fed Reserve Bank Cleveland, Cleveland, OH USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
Rocheteau, Guillaume
Weill, Pierre-Olivier
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Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA