Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

被引：9
|
作者：
Fujinaka, Yuji [1 ]
Wakayama, Takuma [2 ]
机构：
[1] Osaka Univ, Osaka 5670047, Japan
[2] Tokyo Metropolitan Univ, Fac Urban Liberal Arts, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920397, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 100卷 / 01期
关键词：
secure implementation; dominant strategy implementation; Nash implementation; indivisible objects; strategy-proofness;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies secure implementation [Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Economics 2, 203-229] in economies with indivisible objects and money. We establish that on any minimally rich domain that is proposed in our paper, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable. (c) 2007 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved.
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页码：91 / 95
页数：5
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