Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know, and When Do They Know It?

被引:20
|
作者
Jenter, Dirk [1 ,2 ]
Lewellen, Katharina [3 ]
Warner, Jerold B. [4 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Tuck Sch Dartmouth, Hanover, NH USA
[4] Univ Rochester, Simon Sch, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2011年 / 66卷 / 02期
关键词
SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS; EARNINGS-ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT; FUTURE EARNINGS; SHARE REPURCHASES; STOCK REPURCHASES; PERFORMANCE; RETURNS; INCOME; INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01638.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study put option sales on company stock by large firms. An often-cited motivation for these transactions is market timing, and managers' decision to issue puts should be sensitive to whether the stock is undervalued. We provide new evidence that large firms successfully time security sales. In the 100 days following put option issues, there is roughly a 5% abnormal stock return, with much of the abnormal return following the first earnings release date after the sale. Direct evidence on put option exercises reinforces these findings: exercise frequencies and payoffs to put holders are abnormally low.
引用
收藏
页码:413 / 443
页数:31
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