In this article, we aim to open a dialogue between Ravaisson's and Jankelevitch's philosophies. In both authors, an "oblique" way of seizing the essence of being can be found, since being cannot be apprehended directly through intuition. What is at stake is less to insist on the powerlessness of thought than to highlight the excessiveness of what needs to be thought. If philosophy is moved by an initial mismatch vis-a-vis its objects, this lack nevertheless does not condemn it. If we can establish a connection between these two authors, the question of the oblique apprehension of being also reveals a discrepancy between them. For Ravaisson, reflection on mediation relies on the identity of being and thought. For Jankelevitch, on the contrary, this identity is constantly being called into question, so much so that it is rather discontinuity that seems to characterize the essence of reality. The examination of the philosophy of Bergson will make it possible to highlight the discrepancy between Ravaisson and Jankelevitch, in the sense that Jankelevitch's relationship to it is given both in a heritage and in a rupture.
