SENDER-EQUIVOCABLE ENCRYPTION SCHEMES SECURE AGAINST CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS REVISITED

Fehr et al. (2010) proposed the first sender-equivocable encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (NC-CCA) and proved that NC-CCA security implies security against selective opening chosen-ciphertext attacks (SO-CCA). The NC-CCA security proof of the scheme relies on security against substitution attacks of a new primitive, the "cross-authentication code". However, the security of the cross-authentication code cannot be guaranteed when all the keys used in the code are exposed. Our key observation is that, in the NC-CCA security game, the randomness used in the generation of the challenge ciphertext is exposed to the adversary. Based on this observation, we provide a security analysis of Fehr et al.'s scheme, showing that its NC-CCA security proof is flawed. We also point out that the scheme of Fehr et al. encrypting a single-bit plaintext can be refined to achieve NC-CCA security, free of the cross-authentication code. Furthermore, we propose the notion of "strong cross-authentication code", apply it to Fehr et al.'s scheme, and show that the new version of the latter achieves NC-CCA security for multi-bit plaintexts.