Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

被引:0
|
作者
Stark, Johanna [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Tax Law & Publ Finance, Munich, Germany
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM; PAY; SAY; SHAREHOLDERS; OWNERSHIP; AGENTS; COSTS; STOCK;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals, as well as growing shareholder pressure to implement effective measures against executive misbehaviour, the prevalence of such clauses has risen considerably in the recent past, beginning in the US after the 2000 financial crisis. As clawbacks have become a buzzword in the European debate about also ensuring good corporate governance beyond the financial sector, it is time to critically discuss the hopes that have been associated with various types of such provisions.
引用
收藏
页码:669 / 696
页数:28
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