Monetary Incentives, Motivation, and Job Effort in the Public Sector: An Experimental Study With Italian Government Executives

被引:63
|
作者
Belle, Nicola [1 ]
Cantarelli, Paola [1 ]
机构
[1] Bocconi Univ, Dept Policy Anal & Publ Management, I-20136 Milan, Italy
关键词
performance-related pay; monetary incentives; intrinsic motivation; extrinsic motivation; public service motivation; job effort; PERSON-ORGANIZATION FIT; PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY; SERVICE MOTIVATION; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; WORK MOTIVATION; SELF-EFFICACY; BEHAVIOR; CONSCIENTIOUSNESS; METAANALYSIS;
D O I
10.1177/0734371X13520460
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
What effects do financial incentives have on the effort made by public managers? How do different types of work motivation (i.e., intrinsic, extrinsic, and public service motivation) moderate this effect? We addressed these questions using experimental data from a sample of executives working for the Italian central government and found that monetary rewards had no significant effect on the intended effort of the study participants. Furthermore, the relationship between financial incentives and intended effort, which was insignificant overall, was negatively moderated by the intrinsic motivation of the participants, positively moderated by extrinsic motivation, and unaffected by public service motivation.
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页码:99 / 123
页数:25
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