Developing countries and enforcement of trade agreements: Why dispute settlement is not enough

被引:0
|
作者
Bown, Chad P. [1 ,2 ]
Hoekman, Bernard M. [3 ]
机构
[1] Brandeis Univ, Dept Econ, Waltham, MA 02254 USA
[2] Brandeis Univ, Int Business Sch, Waltham, MA 02254 USA
[3] World Bank, Dev Res Grp, Washington, DC 20433 USA
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中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Ogranization (WTO) trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This article examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce WTO rules and disciplines against small and poor Members, bolstering the transparency function of the WTO is important to make trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. While our focus is on the WTO system, our arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.
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页码:177 / 203
页数:27
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