Markets, Hierarchies, and Families: Toward a Transaction Cost Theory of the Family Firm

被引:171
|
作者
Gedajlovic, Eric [1 ,2 ]
Carney, Michael [3 ]
机构
[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Sch Business, Dept Innovat, Vancouver, BC, Canada
[2] Simon Fraser Univ, Sch Business, Dept Entrepreneurship & Strategy, Vancouver, BC, Canada
[3] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, Dept Management, Montreal, PQ, Canada
关键词
BUSINESS GROUPS; COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMERGING MARKETS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; APPROPRIATION; INFORMATION; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00418.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Why do family businesses exist? What factors explain their versatility, limitations, and success within and across different industrial and geographic contexts? We develop a transaction cost framework that addresses these questions. In doing so, we identify a class of assets we term generic nontradeables (GNTs), that are firm specific, but generic in application. While many types of firms may possess such assets, we reason that family firm governance provides relative advantages in developing, sustaining, and appropriating value from GNTs through combinations with other types of assets. We propose that these advantages, as well as some concomitant disadvantages, explain the versatility, limitations, and success of family business enterprise.
引用
收藏
页码:1145 / 1172
页数:28
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