Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies

被引：7
|
作者：
Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2011年 / 146卷 / 02期
关键词：
Infinite games; Correlated equilibrium existence; Informational commonalities; Nonstandard analysis; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; DISCONTINUOUS GAMES; MEASURE-SPACES; PURIFICATION; PROBABILITY; COMPACT; SINGLE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter's [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48-69] argument for correlated equilibrium existence for this class of games, and supplies an alternative proof. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：638 / 655
页数：18
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