The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences

被引：7
|
作者：
Campbell, Donald E. [1 ,2 ]
Kelly, Jerry S. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
[2] Coll William & Mary, Program Publ Policy, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
[3] Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2015年 / 132卷
关键词：
Resoluteness; Neutrality; Anonymity; Perverse; Schur's theorem; Frobenius number;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
When the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, all social choice functions satisfying resoluteness, neutrality, and anonymity (RNA rules) sometimes choose alternatives that everyone ranks near the bottom. When the number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, RNA rules only exist for a small (finite) number of values of the number of alternatives. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：109 / 111
页数：3
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