Bank capital and credit market competition: Will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels?

被引：1
|
作者：
Chen, Yehning [1 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Finance, 1,Sect 4,Roosevelt Rd, Taipei 106, Taiwan
来源：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE | 2016年 / 69卷
关键词：
Bank capital; Debt overhang; Credit market competition; Capital regulation; Deposit insurance; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; MORAL HAZARD; REQUIREMENTS; CRISES; RISK;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.07.006
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper establishes a theoretical model to study the relationship between credit market competition and bank capital. In the model, bank capital can alleviate the debt overhang problem, and the extent to which banks can enjoy the gain of holding capital is decreasing in the competitive pressure in the credit market. It is shown that credit market competition reduces banks' incentive to hold capital. Deposit insurance also induces banks to hold less capital. In addition, bank capital regulation is welfare improving, and banks may voluntarily hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码：247 / 263
页数：17
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