TRIGGERING INSPECTIONS EX OFFICIO: MOVING BEYOND A PASSIVE EU CARTEL POLICY

被引：15

作者：

Friederiszick, Hans W. ^{[1
,2
]}

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] European Commiss, Directorate Gen Competit, Chief Economist Team, Directorate A Policy & Strateg Support, Brussels, Belgium

[2] ESMT, Berlin, Germany

[3] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, Bonn, Germany

[4] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Bonn, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 4卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/joclec/nhm024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The implementation of leniency programs is considered a success both at a EU Community level and in individual member states. The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations for cartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases. Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competition authority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on the prosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow a proactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigations triggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcement tool to the other passive instruments available to a competition authority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspections based on economic criteria is presented allowing for a more proactive cartel policy.

引用

页码：89 / 113

页数：25