Novel lightweight RFID authentication protocols for inexpensive tags

Radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems represent a support technology employed for the internet of things (IoT). Since RFID systems are now used extensively, it would be a mistake to disregard security problems and user privacy protection. However, constraints on computing power and storage resources in inexpensive tags of RFID have made the execution of security issues difficult. In other words, a persistent formidable challenge to RFID security is to design ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for RFID systems in acceptable compatibility with EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standards. Xiao et al. has recently proposed an appropriate lightweight authentication protocol for inexpensive tags by benefiting from the lightweight block cipher algorithm. They have claimed that their proposed protocol is resistant to all of the known attacks which may occur in RFID systems. In this paper, we show that the LRSAS protocol is vulnerable to replay, reader impersonation, tag tracking, and desynchronization attacks. We demonstrate that the use of fixed messages in the communication between the tag and the reader is led to these attacks. To improve the LRSAS protocol, We propose three lightweight protocols LRSAS+, LRARP, and LRARP+. We analyze the security level of the proposed protocols and prove the security of the proposed design using Gong-Needham-Yahalom logic (GNY logic). We also formally confirmed the security of the proposal using the Scyther simulation tool. According to security analysis, we can observe that these protocols have a high level of security. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed protocols is analyzed. A comparison of the performance of these three protocols with similar protocols shows that these protocols are at a better level than similar protocols in terms of computational costs, storage costs, and communication costs.