Sequential Game in a Two-echelon Fuzzy Supply Chain

This study explores the sequential game between a manufacturer and a retailer in a two-echelon supply chain. In the sequential game, the optimal pricing strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer are considered in two different settings in which the manufacturer or retailer is dominant, respectively. The results of any strategy of the sequential game in the two-echelon supply chain will be uncertain because of the complexity of the economic environment and the diversity of influencers. Two game theory models consisting of the Manufacturer-Retailer Structure and Retailer-Manufacturer Structure with the market demand function, manufacturer's manufacturing cost and retailer's operating cost regarded as fuzzy variables are employed. The expected value model and the chance constrained model are introduced to solve the equilibrium solutions. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the sequential game model in the two-echelon supply chain.