Optimal Choice and Beliefs with Ex Ante Savoring and Ex Post Disappointment

被引:29
|
作者
Gollier, Christian [1 ]
Muermann, Alexander [2 ]
机构
[1] Toulouse Sch Econ, F-31042 Toulouse, France
[2] Vienna Univ Econ & Business, Dept Finance Accounting & Stat, A-1190 Vienna, Austria
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
endogenous beliefs; anticipatory feeling; disappointment; optimism; decision under risk; portfolio allocation; insurance demand; INDUCED PREFERENCES; RISK; CONSEQUENCES; EXPECTATIONS; RESOLUTION; FEEDBACK; OUTCOMES; AVERSION;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1100.1185
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We propose a new decision criterion under risk in which individuals extract both utility from anticipatory feelings ex ante and disutility from disappointment ex post. The decision maker chooses his degree of optimism, given that more optimism raises both the utility of ex ante feelings and the risk of disappointment ex post. We characterize the optimal beliefs and the preferences under risk generated by this mental process and apply this criterion to a simple portfolio choice/insurance problem. We show that these preferences are compatible with first-degree and second-degree stochastic dominance and yield a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Furthermore, they are consistent with observed violations of the independence axiom, such as the preference reversal in the Allais paradox, and predict that the decision maker takes on less risk compared to an expected utility maximizer. Our decision criterion can thus help explain the equity premium puzzle and the preference for low deductibles in insurance contracts.
引用
收藏
页码:1272 / 1284
页数:13
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability
    Hiriart, Y
    Martimort, D
    Pouyet, J
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2004, 84 (02) : 231 - 235
  • [2] Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation
    Innes, R
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 2004, 24 (01) : 29 - 48
  • [3] Ex Ante and Ex Post Contractualism: A Synthesis
    Suikkanen, Jussi
    JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 2019, 23 (01): : 77 - 98
  • [4] Ex Ante and Ex Post Contractualism: A Synthesis
    Jussi Suikkanen
    The Journal of Ethics, 2019, 23 : 77 - 98
  • [5] Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence
    Puelz, R
    Snow, A
    JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY, 1997, 14 (02) : 169 - 188
  • [6] Subjective beliefs and ex ante trade
    Rigotti, Luca
    Shannon, Chris
    Strzalecki, Tomasz
    ECONOMETRICA, 2008, 76 (05) : 1167 - 1190
  • [7] Ex ante versus ex post optimal promotion rules: The case of internal promotion
    Waldman, M
    ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 2003, 41 (01) : 27 - 41
  • [8] OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING WITH EX-POST AND EX-ANTE OBSERVABILITY PROBLEMS
    CAMPBELL, TS
    CHAN, YS
    QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1992, 107 (02): : 785 - 795
  • [9] Optimal Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazards: Theory and Evidence
    ROBERT PUELZ
    ARTHUR SNOW
    Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1997, 14 : 169 - 188
  • [10] First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness
    Guo, Xiaoxi
    Sikdar, Sujoy
    Xia, Lirong
    Cao, Yongzhi
    Wang, Hanpin
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IJCAI 2023, 2023, : 2719 - 2727