Electoral clientelism;
Political parties;
Redistribution;
State resources;
PORK-BARREL;
MACHINE POLITICS;
CARTEL PARTY;
DEMOCRATIZATION;
INVESTMENT;
DEMOCRACY;
LINKAGES;
SYSTEMS;
BROKERS;
MODEL;
D O I:
10.1057/s41269-021-00216-5
中图分类号:
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号:
0302 ;
030201 ;
摘要:
Contemporary political parties often use state resources to win elections. In this context, electoral clientelism evolved from the straightforward vote buying to sophisticated exchanges in which the relationship between patrons (parties or candidates) and clients (voters) is sometimes difficult to grasp. We address the question how do the distributive politics and electoral clientelism interact, how these forms of interactions differ across various context, and what implications they bring for the functioning of political systems. The special issue provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the burgeoning literature about the multi-faceted feature of electoral clientelism. It unfolds the complex relationship between distributive politics and clientelism, and conceptualizes electoral clientelism as a dynamic process that occurs through different sequences. It enriches the methodological tools aimed at investigating electoral clientelism. Finally, the special issue approaches clientelism from several perspectives and brings together substantive empirical evidence about the varieties of clientelism around the world.
机构:
Univ British Columbia, Inst Asian Res, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada
Univ British Columbia, Dept Polit Sci, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, CanadaUniv British Columbia, Inst Asian Res, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada
Cruz, Cesi
Keefer, Philip
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h-index: 0
机构:
Interamer Dev Bank, Inst Dev, Washington, DC USAUniv British Columbia, Inst Asian Res, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada