A NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?

被引：0

作者：

Bauducco, Sofia ^{[1
]}

Janiak, Alexandre ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Cent Bank Chile, Santiago, Chile

[2] Univ Chile, Santiago, Chile

来源：

MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 2017年 / 21卷 / 08期

关键词：

Minimum Wage; Employment; Search; Large Firm; UNEMPLOYMENT;

D O I：

10.1017/S1365100516000067

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.

引用

页码：2158 / 2169

页数：12

共 3 条

[1] Minimum wages and firm employment: Evidence from a minimum wage reduction in Greece
Georgiadis, Andreas
Kaplanis, Ioannis
Monastiriotis, Vassilis
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2020, 193
[2] Wage Bargaining and Minimum Wages in a Search-Matching Model
Dittrich, Marcus
[J]. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2021, 23 (04)
[3] Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?
Deltas, George
[J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 43 (06) : 657 - 674

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