Political Appointments and Outcomes in Federal District Courts

被引:2
|
作者
Hubert, Ryan [1 ]
Copus, Ryan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Polit Sci, One Shields Ave, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Univ Missouri, Sch Law, 500 E 52nd St, Kansas City, MO 64110 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF POLITICS | 2022年 / 84卷 / 02期
关键词
judicial politics; federal courts; trial courts; causal inference; HIERARCHY; SELECTION;
D O I
10.1086/716947
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Using an original data set of around 70,000 civil rights cases heard by nearly 200 judges, we study the effect of presidential appointments to federal district courts. We provide the first causal estimates of whether lawsuits end differently depending on their assignment to either a Democratic or a Republican appointed judge. We show Republican appointees cause fewer settlements and more dismissals, favoring defendants by around 5 percentage points. We estimate a similarly sized effect for a sample of civil rights appeals heard in the Ninth Circuit, raising questions about the conventional wisdom that politics matters more at higher levels of the judicial hierarchy. We also find that the effect in district courts has increased over time. For cases filed during the Obama presidency, Republican appointees caused pro-defendant outcomes in 7.4% more cases than Democratic appointees. Our results suggest that district courts are an important-although neglected-subject of research for political scientists.
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页码:908 / 922
页数:15
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