Evolutionary Game Analysis and Simulations for Intra-Village Conflict of Collective Land Expropriation

With rapid urbanization, the social risk caused by collective land expropriation has been increasing. Land conflict rather than the farmers' burden has been the first important issue affecting social security in rural areas. The existing studies on land conflict pay few attentions to intra-village conflict of collective land expropriation. The behavior logic and evolution rule of farmers and village committee remains unknown during the conflict of collective land expropriation. Therefore, the governmental measures lack solid basis to solve such conflicts. This study conducts evolutionary game analysis to find the evolutionary stable strategy of farmers and village committee during conflicts based on the assumption of bounded rationality. Through NetLogo platform, multi-agent based simulation is conducted to validate the results of evolutionary game analysis. This study provides theoretical references for solving intra-village conflicts during collective land expropriation.