The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders

被引:0
|
作者
Pried, Jesse M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
YALE LAW JOURNAL | 2015年 / 124卷 / 05期
关键词
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION STRUCTURE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; AGENCY COSTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHARE REPURCHASES; MARKET; STOCK; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; FIRMS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This Article challenges a persistent and pervasive view in corporate law and corporate governance: that a firm's managers should favor long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders, and maximize long-term shareholders' returns rather than the short-term stock price. Underlying this view is a strongly held intuition that taking steps to increase long-term shareholder returns will generate a larger economic pie over time. I show, however, that this intuition is flawed. Long-term shareholders, like short-term shareholders, can benefit from managers' destroying value even when the firm's only residual claimants are its shareholders. Indeed, managers serving long-term shareholders may well destroy more value than managers serving short-term shareholders. Favoring the interests of long-term shareholders could thus reduce, rather than increase, the value generated by a firm over time.
引用
收藏
页码:1554 / 1627
页数:74
相关论文
共 50 条