Political economy of taxation in an overlapping-generations economy

被引:25
|
作者
Bassetto, Marco [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL 60604 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
social security; bargaining; distortionary taxes;
D O I
10.1016/j.red.2007.06.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes the effects of intergenerational conflict on capital and labor income tax rates, transfers, and government spending in a model of multidimensional policy choice. The different nature of tax liabilities for the young and the old can explain why the old receive large gross lump-sum transfers through social security, while the young receive little or none. A natural link also emerges between the size of the government as a provider of public goods and the magnitude of transfers that the same government will implement. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:18 / 43
页数:26
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