We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.
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S China Normal Univ, South China Ctr Market Econ Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
S China Normal Univ, Sci Lab Econ Behav, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaS China Normal Univ, South China Ctr Market Econ Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Dong, Zhiqiang
Wei, Xiahai
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S China Normal Univ, South China Ctr Market Econ Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaS China Normal Univ, South China Ctr Market Econ Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Wei, Xiahai
Zhang, Yongjing
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Univ Ottawa, Grad Sch Publ & Int Affairs, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, CanadaS China Normal Univ, South China Ctr Market Econ Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China