Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes

被引:114
|
作者
Mares, Isabela [1 ]
Young, Lauren [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Polit Sci, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
clientelism; voter intimidation; brokers; elections; democratization; ballot secrecy; MACHINE POLITICS; NIGERIAN ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEMS; FIELD EXPERIMENT; LATIN-AMERICA; SECRET BALLOT; FORMAL MODEL; NEW-YORK; CLIENTELISM; VIOLENCE;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-polisci-060514-120923
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
In elections around the world, large numbers of voters are influenced by promises or threats that are contingent on how they vote. Recently, the political science literature has made considerable progress in disaggregating clientelism along two dimensions: first, in recognizing the diversity of actors working as brokers, and second, in conceptualizing and disaggregating types of clientelism based on positive and negative inducements of different forms. In this review, we discuss recent findings explaining variation in the mix of clientelistic strategies across countries, regions, and individuals and identify a few areas for future progress, particularly in explaining variation in targeting of inducements by politicians on different types of voters.
引用
收藏
页码:267 / 288
页数:22
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