Aspirations and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model

被引:0
|
作者
Hamada, Kojun [1 ]
Shinozaki, Tsuyoshi [2 ]
Yanagihara, Mitsuyoshi [3 ]
机构
[1] Niigata Univ, Fac Econ, Nishi Ku, 8050 Ikarashi 2 No Cho, Niigata, Niigata 9502181, Japan
[2] Tohoku Gakuin Univ, Fac Econ, Aoba Ku, 1-3-1 Tsuchitoi, Sendai, Miyagi 9808511, Japan
[3] Nagoya Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Chikusa Ku, Furo Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4648601, Japan
关键词
Aspirations; Transfer paradox; Overlapping generations model; Capital accumulation; GENERALIZED THEORY; TRANSPORT COSTS; HABIT FORMATION; OPTIMAL-GROWTH; ALTRUISM; DYNAMICS; WELFARE; TASTES; TRADE;
D O I
10.1007/s00712-017-0537-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the transfer problem between two countries when either the donor or the recipient has aspirations, based on parents' standards of living, in a one-sector overlapping generations model. Focusing on whether and how aspirations impact the welfare effect of a transfer, we demonstrate the following results. First, when the donor forms aspirations, as the degree of his/her aspirations to their parents increases, a transfer is more likely to cause donor enrichment. However, this does not affect the recipient's welfare at all. In contrast, when the recipient forms aspirations, whether the increase in the degree of these aspirations causes immiserization depends on whether the transfer raises the recipient's consumption. Second, we show that if the donor's or recipient's marginal utility increases with their respective aspirations, the transfer is more likely to cause recipient immiserization. However, whether donor enrichment occurs depends on the situation. These results imply that there are two types of effects that aspirations can have on the welfare of both countries: effects caused by the aspirations, and effects that occur through the capital market. Furthermore, we find that these two effects on welfare do not necessarily work in the same direction.
引用
收藏
页码:279 / 301
页数:23
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