Impact of pay disparities between chief executive officers and chief financial officers on corporate financial and investment policies

被引:4
|
作者
Han, Feng [1 ]
Che, Xin [2 ]
He, Enya [3 ]
机构
[1] Capital Univ Econ & Business, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Calif State Univ Fullerton, Fullerton, CA 92634 USA
[3] Lloyds London, Dallas, TX USA
关键词
chief financial officer; financial policy; investment policy; pay disparities; tournament incentives; TOURNAMENT INCENTIVES; TOP-MANAGEMENT; PERFORMANCE; RISK; COMPENSATION; EQUITY; FIRMS; PRICE; SIDE;
D O I
10.1111/jifm.12142
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study whether and how pay disparities between chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) affect corporate policies. Consistent with the tournament theory, we find a positive association between the CEO-CFO pay disparity and aggressiveness in corporate financial and investment policies. Specifically, a firm with a large CEO-CFO pay disparity tends to have an aggressive capital structure and tilt toward high-risk investments. Furthermore, we test the impact of the CEO-CFO pay disparity on firm value and show that the pay disparity is positively associated with firm value. Overall, we conclude that CEO-CFO pay disparities provide CFOs with tournament incentives to not only adopt aggressive corporate policies but also select better investment projects. Our research highlights the career-enhancing and value-creating effects of CEO-CFO pay disparities as well as the important role of CFOs' incentives on the treasurer side of their duties.
引用
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页码:57 / 82
页数:26
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