The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

被引:39
|
作者
Amel-Zadeh, Amir [1 ]
Zhang, Yuan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
[2] Univ Texas Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083 USA
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2015年 / 90卷 / 01期
关键词
financial restatements; market for corporate control; mergers and acquisitions; information risk; corporate governance; INTERNAL CONTROL DEFICIENCIES; EARNINGS QUALITY; TAKEOVER TARGETS; ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; INFORMATION; COST; DISCLOSURE; ACCRUALS; MERGERS;
D O I
10.2308/accr-50869
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control.
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页码:1 / 29
页数:29
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