DIAGNOSING FORECLOSURE DUE TO EXCLUSIVE DEALING

被引：21
|
作者：
Asker, John [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Coll Arts & Letters, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
[2] NBER, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 64卷 / 03期
关键词：
EAT CEREAL INDUSTRY; NAKED EXCLUSION; DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS; DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION; VERTICAL AGREEMENTS; MARKET; CONTRACTS; RETAILERS; PRICE; BEER;
D O I：
10.1111/joie.12114
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor agrees to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets. This paper evaluates the effect of exclusive distribution arrangements on competition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. A diagnostic test is provided to judge whether exclusive arrangements lead to foreclosure. To implement this test a model of consumer demand and firm behavior is estimated that incorporates industry details and allows for distribution through exclusive and shared channels. The test indicates that foreclosure effects are not present in this market.
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页码：375 / 410
页数：36
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