Illegal dumping of construction and demolition (C&D) waste is a major concern for environmental policymakers. Three different environmental law enforcement policies, aimed at the reduction of illegal C&D waste dumping, are enforced in Israel. These policies include fines (F), vehicle impoundment (V), and criminal indictment (I) by the court. Although, the scope of illegal C&D waste dumping in Israel appears to decline, little is known which of the above policies has been effective in combating the phenomenon. In an attempt to answer this question, we use data on F-V-I instances, recorded between July 2007 and December 2016, and compare them with monthly changes in the ratio between the amount of waste brought to authorized waste dumping sites and the estimated amount of C&D waste generated in the country each month. As the study shows, only the V-sanction was found to be significantly affecting the ratio (t = 3.083; p < 0.01), while the effect of other policy was found insignificant. We explain low efficiency of other law enforcement policies by relatively small fines imposed on the offenders, long court proceedings, combined with a relatively low chance of being caught. By contrast, the V-sanction may be more effective because it results in immediate and severe economic losses to the offenders, causing C&D waste transporters to haul their load to authorized sites. As we argue, for an environmental enforcement policy to be effective, it should be adequate to the severity of the offense and applied swiftly. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
