Are Overlapping Local Governments Competing With Each Other When Issuing Debt?

被引:3
|
作者
Brien, Spencer T. [1 ]
Yan, Wenli
机构
[1] Naval Postgrad Sch, 555 Dyer Rd, Monterey, CA 93943 USA
来源
PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE | 2020年 / 40卷 / 02期
关键词
vertical externalities; municipal bonds; fiscal common resources; property taxation; tax competition; FISCAL INTERDEPENDENCE; STRATEGIC INTERACTION; PATTERNS; COUNTY; STATE;
D O I
10.1111/pbaf.12264
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Local public services are produced through various overlapping jurisdictions. This study examines how the issuance of municipal general obligation bonds is affected by the tax policies of overlapping local governments. The findings challenge the hypothesis that the shared tax base would be overused in a common-pool resource scenario. Instead, the empirical results show that the issuance of general obligation bonds is more likely in jurisdictions where counties and school districts make more intensive use of the property tax. These findings highlight the importance of the signals local governments receive from their overlapping neighbors regarding voters' demand for additional public spending.
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页码:75 / 92
页数:18
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