Can central bank independence be counterproductive? An open economy illustration.

被引:0
|
作者
Desquilbet, JB [1 ]
Villieu, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Orleans, Lab Econ Orleans, Inst Orleanais Finance, UMR 6586, F-45067 Orleans 2, France
来源
REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 1998年 / 49卷 / 06期
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows that, in a static two-country game theoretic model, delegating the monetary policy to an independent,, central bank may be counter-productive. The decision to delegate or not must be taken in the framework of a prisoners' dilemma, which leads to the question of how to coordinate the policymakers' decision on the <<good>> equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码:1415 / 1434
页数:20
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