SETTING LIMITS TO PRACTICAL REFLECTION AGAINST PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE

被引:0
|
作者
Sommavilla, Vitor [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Fed Paraiba UFPB, Dept Filosofia CCHLA Ambiente 20, Campus 1 Cidade Univ, BR-58051900 Joao Pessoa, Paraiba, Brazil
关键词
deliberation; metaethical constructivism; philosophy as a way of life; practical reasons; self-examination;
D O I
10.1111/meta.12412
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
According to a tradition going back to Socrates, one should thoroughly examine the grounds of one's judgments before settling on what one has reason to do or believe. According to contemporary metaethical constructivism, assumed in this essay, reflective scrutiny is also central to assessing a judgment's claim to justification. This essay argues against the injunctions to thoroughly examine oneself and seek ultimate reasons for one's normative judgments. In other words, the essay argues against the ideal of the philosophical way of life. It shows that in most cases one does not have reason to question the practical conclusion of one's initial deliberation. It is only under very limited conditions, specified in the essay, that one is justified in engaging in further reflection. Furthermore, the essay argues that if one does go for full self-examination, the consequences are most likely to be bad for oneself, given one's practical interests.
引用
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页码:375 / 390
页数:16
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