Testing willingness to pay elicitation mechanisms in the field: Evidence from Uganda

被引:14
|
作者
Burchardi, Konrad B. [1 ,2 ]
de Quidt, Jonathan [1 ,3 ]
Gulesci, Selim [4 ,5 ,6 ]
Lerva, Benedetta [7 ,8 ]
Tripodi, Stefano [9 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] ThReD, CESifo, CEPR, BREAD, Oakland, CA USA
[3] ThReD, CESifo, CEPR, CAGE, Oakland, CA USA
[4] Trinity Coll Dublin, Dept Econ, Dublin, Ireland
[5] Trinity Coll Dublin, TIME Trin Impact Evaluat Unit, Dublin, Ireland
[6] LEAP, J PAL, CEPR, BREAD, Dublin, Ireland
[7] Stockholm Sch Econ, Mistra Ctr Sustainable Markets, SE-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
[8] World Bank, 1818 H St NW, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[9] Copenhagen Business Sch, Dept Econ, Porcelaenshaven 16A, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
基金
瑞典研究理事会;
关键词
Willingness to pay; Becker-DeGroot-Marschak; Field experiment; ALLOCATION; PREFERENCE; SUBSIDIES; AUCTIONS; IMPACT; VALUES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102701
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.
引用
收藏
页数:8
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