Corporate governance practices and companies' R&D intensity: Evidence from European countries

被引:116
|
作者
Honore, Florence [1 ]
Munari, Federico [2 ]
de La Potterie, Bruno van Pottelsberghe [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Carlson Sch Management, Strateg Management & Entrepreneurship Dept, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[2] Univ Bologna, Dept Management, I-40123 Bologna, Italy
[3] Univ Libre Bruxelles, SBS EM, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
关键词
R&D intensity; Corporate governance; Remuneration; Shareholder rights; DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH; MANAGERIAL MYOPIA; STRATEGIC CONTROL; FIRM PERFORMANCE; STOCK-MARKET; AGENCY COSTS; CASH FLOW;
D O I
10.1016/j.respol.2014.10.016
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper empirically investigates whether corporate governance practices implemented to align shareholders' and managers' interests affect the resources firms devote to R&D. Two databases - one on governance ratings and one on R&D investment - are merged to obtain a multi-country, multi-sector sample of 177 European companies involved in R&D activities. The results suggest that limitations of anti-takeover devices and voting rights restrictions, a financial performance-based remuneration system for managers and a higher shareholders' consensus at the annual general assembly are all negatively correlated with R&D intensity. In other words, governance practices that are designed to respond to the short-term expectations of financial markets might prove to be detrimental to long-term R&D investments. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:533 / 543
页数:11
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