International Criminal Liability for Spreading Disinformation in the Context of Mass Atrocity

In the context of international crimes, falsehoods - ranging from selective reporting of facts, deliberate mischaracterization of events and adversaries, or even plain fabrication and lies - constitute a breeding ground in which incitement to commit violence can thrive. While disseminating such falsehoods does not constitute a direct call to commit physical violence, it nevertheless sows the seeds for mass atrocities. This article considers the outer limits of International Criminal Law (ICL) - defined by the principle of culpability - by enquiring whether campaigns of disinformation in the context of mass atrocities could ever give rise to individual responsibility. On the basis of the Fritzsche, Gvero and Mbarushimana cases, liability for disseminating disinformation might in principle be engaged before, during and even after the commission of such crimes. Recent concerns about the role of Facebook in Myanmar also pose the question whether social media companies or their personnel may be liable for amplifying disinformation campaigns. Yet, overall, these cases show the unease of ICL in criminalizing disinformation contributing to atrocity crimes.