COALITION-PROOFNESS VERSUS EQUILIBRIUM IN INFINITE HORIZON GAMES

被引：0
|
作者：
Horniacek, Milan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Comenius Univ, Fac Social & Econ Sci, Inst Econ, SK-82005 Bratislava, Slovakia
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN ECONOMICS (MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION MAKING XIV) | 2008年
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D O I：
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中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (to which folk theorems for infinite horizon games apply) requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in all proper subgames. Strong perfect equilibrium takes into account also deviations by coalitions of players. Nevertheless, it fails to exist in many games of economic interest. The immunity to deviations by the grand coalition is often in conflict with the immunity to deviations by smaller coalitions. In the present paper we discuss some possibilities of resolution of this conflict.
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页码：76 / 82
页数：7
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