Pacific Rim experiences with individual transferable quotas: Implications for fisheries policy in California

The concept of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries grew out of papers by natural resource economists F. Scott Gordon, Francis Christy, Peter Pearse and others between 1954 and 1979. Individual transferable quotas generally involve the assignment of a portion of the overall total allowable catch to individual fishers, companies, or communities. These quasi-property rights usually are transferable. In theory, this management technique provides incentives that will lead to reduction in the overcapitalization common in fisheries and lead to a more orderly, economically productive fishery. Individual quota systems have been implemented around the Pacific Rim in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Alaska. In this paper I will report on my field studies on individual quota programs in New Zealand and British Columbia. I examined the effects of these quota management systems on individual fishers, processors, tribes, and agency personnel. In general, the quota systems have ended the "race for fish" that has long plagued fisheries. Harvesters who own quota shares have usually received higher prices for their catch, often due to their motivation to develop innovative marketing and added value products. Crew employment has changed. In New Zealand, ITQs have accelerated fishery claims of Maori and they now control about 40 percent of all fishery quotas. Primary issues that have surfaced in the first decade of ITQ experience include methods for initial quota allocation, transferability, quota aggregation limits, research and management cost recovery, and resource conservation.