Existence and Strong Uncountability

On the standard view for something to exist is for one thing to exist: in slogan form, to be is to be countable (cf. van Inwagen 2009). E.J. Lowe (2009, 2003, 1998) argues something can exist without being countable as one, however. His primary example is homogenous "stuff," i.e., qualitatively uniform and infinitely divisible matter. Lacking nonarbitrary boundaries and being everywhere the same, homogenous stuff lacks a principle of individuation that would yield countably distinct constituents. So, for Lowe, homogenous stuff is strongly uncountable. Olson (2011) rejects Lowe's view and defends the orthodox connection between existence and number. He argues that if there is any stuff, there is a (determinate) number of portions of stuff. Sider (2011, 2001) also rejects a stuff ontology, claiming it is incompatible with his preferred view that the familiar quantifiers of predicate logic carve at nature's joints. Against these arguments, I defend the uncountability of stuff and the possibility of existence without countability. If to be is to be countable, more is needed than the arguments that Olson and Sider provide.