Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly

被引：4
|
作者：
Matsumura, Toshihiro [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 1130033, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 115卷 / 01期
关键词：
Supply obligation; Unique pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium; Mixed markets; PRICE-COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; PRIVATIZATION; EQUILIBRIUM; EXISTENCE; FIRMS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium). (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：94 / 96
页数：3
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