Do private equity owners increase risk of financial distress and bankruptcy?

被引:77
|
作者
Tykvova, Tereza [1 ]
Borell, Mariela [1 ]
机构
[1] Ctr European Econ Res ZEW, Dept Int Finance & Financial Management, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany
关键词
Private equity; Buyout; Financial distress; Bankruptcy; PROPENSITY SCORE; MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS; LEVERAGED BUYOUTS; VENTURE; SYNDICATION; PERFORMANCE; INVESTMENT; PREDICTION; REPUTATION; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.11.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In this study, we investigate financial distress risks of European companies around the buyout event in the period between 2000 and 2008. In addition, we analyze whether buyout companies go bankrupt more often than comparable non-buyout companies. Our results suggest that private equity investors select companies which are less financially distressed than comparable non-buyout companies and that the distress risk increases after the buyout. Despite this increase, private equity-backed companies do not suffer from higher bankruptcy rates than comparable non-buyout companies. In fact, when companies are backed by experienced private equity funds, their bankruptcy rates are even lower. These findings indicate that experienced investors are better able to manage distress risks than their inexperienced counterparts. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:138 / 150
页数:13
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