Change, continuity, and the evolution of the law

被引:60
|
作者
Maltzman, Forrest [1 ]
Shipan, Charles R. [2 ]
机构
[1] George Washington Univ, Washington, DC 20052 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Polit Sci, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00311.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Congress regularly passes significant laws. Some of these laws continue in their initial form, with the original bargain struck by the enacting coalition untouched by any future laws; others are changed-strengthened or weakened-soon after passage. What accounts for this variation in the stability of laws, in the longevity of the original legislative agreement? We contend that political conditions at the time of enactment-in particular, the existence of divided government and the level of ideological disagreement between the House and Senate-influence the likelihood that a law will be amended. We demonstrate that laws originally crafted by diverse political coalitions are less durable than those crafted by strong, unified coalitions, which are in a position to entrench their preferred policies and protect them from future change. Furthermore, we show that the probability of a law being amended is affected by future political conditions, the actions of the judiciary, and factors specific to the law.
引用
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页码:252 / 267
页数:16
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