Oligopolistic Trade and Competition in Wages Legislations

被引：1
|
作者：
Van Long, Ngo [1 ,2 ]
Soubeyran, Antoine [3 ]
机构：
[1] CIRANO, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] McGill Univ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[3] Univ Aix Marseille II, GREQAM, Marseille, France
来源：
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1998年 / 49卷 / 02期
关键词：
F13;
D O I：
10.1111/1468-5876.00077
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Wages legislation, or selective enforcement of such legislation, may be used to enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. We show that, if domestic and foreign firms produce close substitutes and are Bertrand rivals, then wages legislation and enforcement display the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Other scenarios are also investigated.
引用
收藏
页码：158 / 170
页数：13
相关论文
共 50 条
12345