WHETHER ANALYST TRACKING CAN IMPROVE THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE QUALITY OF LISTED COMPANIES?

The information disclosure quality of listed companies not only influences the operational efficiency of the capital market but also determines whether they can effectively protect the legitimate rights of investors. To explore whether the tracking investigation behaviour of analysts can influence the information disclosure quality of listed companies, using panel data of Chinese A-share companies during 2011-2020, mechanisms of analyst tracking on the information disclosure quality of listed companies were analysed by the two-way fixed effect model and Ordered-Probit model. Endogenous problems were addressed using the Instrumental Variable (IV) method and placebo test, followed by a robustness test. Results demonstrate that analyst tracking can significantly improve the information disclosure quality of listed companies and is conducive to improving the governance level of companies. It is an important external supervision governance mechanism. Conclusions can help government sectors to formulate relevant policies and encourage analysts to conduct tracking investigations of listed companies.