R&D rivalry with endogenous compatibility

被引：2
|
作者：
Heywood, John S. [1 ]
Wang, Zerong [2 ]
Ye, Guangliang [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Wisconsin Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI USA
[2] Renmin Univ China, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Hainan Univ, 58 Renmin Ave, Haikou 570228, Hainan, Peoples R China
来源：
MANCHESTER SCHOOL | 2022年 / 90卷 / 03期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
endogenous compatibility; installed base; R&D cooperation; R&D rivalry; NETWORK EXTERNALITIES; MARKETS; INNOVATION; DUOPOLY;
D O I：
10.1111/manc.12399
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A classic R&D rivalry is compared to R&D cooperation while embedded in a model of endogenous network compatibility. We show that complete incompatibility is more likely to occur with cooperative R&D. Complete incompatibility increases the advantage in R&D and profitability of the incumbent over the entrant. In our initial illustration, cooperation in network industries with endogenous compatibility generates no higher (and often lower) welfare than in non-network industries. In our generalization, cooperation in network industries generates welfare loss for a wider range of R&D spillovers. This suggests that R&D cooperation should receive stricter policy scrutiny in network industries with endogenous compatibility.
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页码：354 / 384
页数：31
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