Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

被引:24
|
作者
Polishchuk, L
Savvateev, A
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, IRIS Ctr, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] New Econ Sch, Moscow 117418, Russia
关键词
property rights; political preferences; institutional change; production and appropriation;
D O I
10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00173.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.
引用
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页码:103 / 127
页数:25
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