Debt, incentives and performance:: Evidence from UK panel data

被引:26
|
作者
Dessí, R [1 ]
Robertson, D
机构
[1] Univ Toulouse, Toulouse, France
[2] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
来源
ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2003年 / 113卷 / 490期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00159
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A large body of theoretical literature suggests that capital structure plays an important role as a managerial incentive mechanism. What of the evidence for the agency approach? Cross-sectional empirical studies have identified a positive effect of leverage on expected performance (measured by Q) for firms with low growth opportunities. However, this evidence does not take into account the endogeneity of capital structure decisions. Our paper investigates the determinants of capital structure and performance, allowing for endogeneity and dynamics. Our results Suggest that conclusions reached by previous studies which did not take into account the endogeneity issue should be treated with caution.
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页码:903 / 919
页数:17
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