Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India

被引:18
|
作者
Markussen, Thomas [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Copenhagen, Dept Econ, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark
来源
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES | 2011年 / 47卷 / 11期
关键词
PRO-POOR;
D O I
10.1080/00220388.2011.561330
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The article discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.
引用
收藏
页码:1721 / 1738
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条