An experimental study of charity hazard: The effect of risky and ambiguous government compensation on flood insurance demand

被引:6
|
作者
Robinson, Peter John [1 ]
Botzen, W. J. Wouter [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Zhou, Fujin [1 ]
机构
[1] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Inst Environm Studies, Dept Environm Econ, De Boelelaan 1087, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Univ Utrecht, Utrecht Univ Sch Econ USE, POB 80125, NL-3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands
[3] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Risk Management & Decis Proc Ctr, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
Ambiguity preferences; Charity hazard; Economic experiment; Flood insurance demand; Risk preferences; EXPECTED UTILITY; CLIMATE-CHANGE; SAMARITANS DILEMMA; DECISION-MAKING; DISASTER; ATTITUDES; LOSSES; MODEL; PREFERENCES; MITIGATION;
D O I
10.1007/s11166-021-09365-6
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the problem of "charity hazard," which is the crowding out of private insurance demand by government compensation. In the context of flood insurance and disaster financing, charity hazard is particularly worrisome given current trends of increasing flood risks as a result of climate change and more people choosing to locate in high-risk areas. We conduct an experimental analysis of the influence on flood insurance demand of risk and ambiguity preferences and the availability of different forms of government compensation for disaster damage. Certain and risky government compensation crowd out demand, confirming charity hazard, but this is not observed for ambiguous compensation. Ambiguity averse subjects have higher insurance demand when government compensation is ambiguous relative to risky. Policy recommendations are discussed to overcome charity hazard.
引用
收藏
页码:275 / 318
页数:44
相关论文
共 41 条
  • [1] An experimental study of charity hazard: The effect of risky and ambiguous government compensation on flood insurance demand
    Peter John Robinson
    W. J. Wouter Botzen
    Fujin Zhou
    [J]. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2021, 63 : 275 - 318
  • [2] Charity hazard and the flood insurance protection gap: An EU scale assessment under climate change
    Tesselaar, Max
    Botzen, W. J. Wouter
    Robinson, Peter J.
    Aerts, Jeroen C. J. H.
    Zhou, Fujin
    [J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 193
  • [3] The effect of the availability of charity care to the uninsured on the demand for private health insurance
    Herring, B
    [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 2005, 24 (02) : 225 - 252
  • [4] How trust in the government's flood response influences perception of flood hazard risk: Experimental evidences in China
    Li, Kai
    Yu, Feng
    Yang, Shenlong
    Guo, Yongyu
    [J]. ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY, 2024,
  • [5] Determinants of Probability Neglect and Risk Attitudes for Disaster Risk: An Online Experimental Study of Flood Insurance Demand among Homeowners
    Robinson, Peter John
    Botzen, W. J. Wouter
    [J]. RISK ANALYSIS, 2019, 39 (11) : 2514 - 2527
  • [6] THE STUDY OF INSURANCE PREMIUM RATE GIS MAPPING CONSIDERING THE STORM AND FLOOD HAZARD RISKS
    Lee, J. S.
    Lee, I. S.
    [J]. XXIII ISPRS CONGRESS, COMMISSION VIII, 2016, 41 (B8): : 95 - 98
  • [7] Comparing the effects of behaviorally informed interventions on flood insurance demand: an experimental analysis of 'boosts' and 'nudges'
    Bradt, Jacob
    [J]. BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC POLICY, 2022, 6 (03) : 485 - 515
  • [8] The joint effect of government crop insurance and loan programmes on the demand for futures hedging
    Coble, KH
    Miller, JC
    Zuniga, M
    Heifner, R
    [J]. EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2004, 31 (03) : 309 - 330
  • [9] ESTIMATING THE MORAL-HAZARD EFFECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MEDICAL INSURANCE IN THE DEMAND FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS BY THE ELDERLY
    COULSON, NE
    TERZA, JV
    NESLUSAN, CA
    STUART, BC
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1995, 85 (02): : 122 - 126
  • [10] A Cross-National Study of Government Social Insurance as an Alternative to Tort Liability Compensation
    Kerr, Dana A.
    Ma, Yu-Luen
    Schmit, Joan T.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, 2009, 76 (02) : 367 - 384