Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives

被引：6
|
作者：
Laruelle, Annick [2 ,3 ]
Valenciano, Federico [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Basque Country, Dept Econ Aplicada 4, Bilbao 48015, Spain
[2] Univ Basque Country, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ 1, Bilbao 48015, Spain
[3] Basque Fdn Sci, IKERBASQUE, Bilbao 48011, Spain
来源：
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2010年 / 35卷 / 02期
关键词：
DECISION-RULES; VOTING SYSTEM; COUNCIL;
D O I：
10.1007/s00355-009-0438-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a committee of representatives that makes dichotomous choices (acceptance/rejection) by vote. Given the size of each group represented, what is the most adequate voting rule for the committee? We provide answers based on each of the two principles commonly used to make normative assessments in different contexts: egalitarianism and utilitarianism. To that end, we introduce utilities into the model and adopt a normative approach.
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页码：221 / 243
页数：23
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