Does Managerial Foreign Experience Deter Corporate Fraud

被引:4
|
作者
Luo, Jia [1 ]
Wang, Li [2 ]
机构
[1] Hunan Normal Univ, Sch Business, Hunan Key Lab Macroecon Big Data Min & Its Applic, Changsha, Peoples R China
[2] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Res Inst Social Sci, Govt Accounting Res Inst, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Managerial foreign experience; corporate fraud; information environment; China; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; BRAIN GAIN; COMPENSATION; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTOR; QUALITY; RIGHTS; CHINA;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2021.1973424
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore how managers with foreign experience affect corporate fraud in China. By employing a bivariate probit model with partial observability, we find that returnee managers significantly reduce the incidence of corporate fraud, and increase the probability of being detected, dependent on the given fraud. Improved corporate information environment may mainly drive our results. Furthermore, the impact of returnee managers on fraud deterrence also varies according to the different nature of foreign managerial experience, positions of returnee managers, and types of corporate frauds. Overall, we offer new evidence that returnee managers have an increased awareness of corporate fraud.
引用
收藏
页码:342 / 364
页数:23
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